Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 10
Issue 1
Arbitrating Sports: Reflections on USADA/
Landis, the Olympic Games, and the Future of
International Sports Dispute Resolution

Article 5

12-1-2010

Lessons from USADA v. Jenkins: You Can't Win When You Beat a
Monopoly
Michael S. Straubel

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law
Commons, International Law Commons, and the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael S. Straubel, Lessons from USADA v. Jenkins: You Can't Win When You Beat a Monopoly , 10 Pepp.
Disp. Resol. L.J. Iss. 1 (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol10/iss1/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Straubel: Lessons from <em>USADA v. Jenkins</em>: You Can't Win When You Be

[Vol. 10: 1, 2009]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Lessons from USADA v. Jenkins:
You Can't Win When You Beat a
Monopoly
Michael S. Straubel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the reporters who wanted to speak with LaTasha Jenkins,
she was the first athlete in the seven-year history of the United States AntiDoping Agency (USADA) to win and clear herself of doping charges.'
USADA's record was now thirty-seven and one. 2 Remarkably, the flawless
record was beaten by a group of third year law students and their professor.3
But LaTasha did not want to speak with the reporters. To LaTasha, she had
not won. She had been dragged through the mud, her career had been ended,
and she was emotionally exhausted. Talking to reporters would only remind
her of the damage done. She would never speak to reporters and quietly
retire.
The story of USADA v. Jenkins, and the failed appeal by the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) that followed, is the story of a lucky win
against a multi-headed foe that makes all the rules, then changes the rules
when it loses, in a system nearly incapable of addressing the inherent
imbalance of power between athletes and their accusers. The telling of
LaTasha's story reveals the flaws of the Olympic Movement's anti-doping

* This article, as well as the effort in LaTasha Jenkins' case, was a group effort of the Valparaiso
University Sports Law Clinic. The following Clinic members directly participating in drafting this
article: Brian Raterman, Ehiman Uwidia, Jamie Flowers, Jeffrey Lehrman, Michael Meyer, Reid
Murtaugh, Tiffini Grimes, and Alecia Pehr. The author wrote much of this article from personal
knowledge of his experience with the details of LaTasha Jenkins' case and appeal.
1.

See Amy Shipley, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency Loses Its First Case: Jenkins Found Not

Guilty, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2007, at E04. USADA is an independent, anti-doping agency for the
United States Olympic Movement. It is "responsible for managing the anti-doping testing and
adjudication processes for member constituents pursuant to USADA Protocol for Olympic
Movement Testing." USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 1 (2008).
2. See id.
3. Id.
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system and suggests steps to fix those flaws. However, her story also shows
that those flaws will not be fixed unless the underlying imbalance of power
between athletes and those who control sports is changed.
II. THE STORY OF USADA v. JENKINS

A.

Athletic History

LaTasha Jenkins became the first National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) Champion in Ball State University history when she
won the 200 meter sprint in 1999. 4 After Ball State, LaTasha headed to
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, to attend Middle Tennessee State University
(MTSU) and to work with and be coached by longtime MTSU coach Dean
Hayes. Under Coach Hayes' guidance, LaTasha steadily improved her times
and moved into a top ten world ranking in the 100 and 200 meter sprints.
Among her more notable accomplishments, LaTasha won the 2001 U.S.A.
Track and Field (USATF) Indoor Championships in the 200 meters and a
silver medal in the 200 at the International Association of Athletics
Foundation (IAAF) 5 World Indoor Championships that same year. 6 She
was ranked fourth in the world for the 200 meters that year.7 Over the next
two years, LaTasha bounced between concentrating on the 100 meters and
the 200 meters. In 2003, she finished fourth at the USATF Outdoor
Championships, 8 one spot away from qualifying for the World
Championships.
After the 2003 season, injuries, bum-out, and life pushed LaTasha away
from the track. In 2004, she went back to school and obtained her Master's
Degree in Public Health from MTSU.
Refreshed and repaired after
obtaining her Masters, LaTasha returned to training in 2005. This time, her
sponsor, Nike, did not want her to train with Coach Hayes. As a condition
of her sponsorship contract, Nike told LaTasha that she had to leave

4. ANTHONY 0. EDMONDS
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 99 (2001).

&

E. BRUCE GEELHOED, BALL STATE UNIVERSITY:

AN

5. The IAAF is the world governing body for a variety of sport athletes, including track and
field. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 3.
Track
&
Field,
LaTasha
Jenkins,
6. USA
http://www.usatf.org/athletes/bios/oldBios/2003/JenkinsLatasha.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2009).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Murfreesboro and Coach Hayes for Raleigh, North Carolina, and Coach
Trevor Graham, the most successful sprint coach in the world at that time. 9
LaTasha reluctantly uprooted and moved to Raleigh, only to discover
she really was not being coached by the soon infamous Trevor Graham.
LaTasha was the new, less accomplished, outsider to Graham's training
group. Graham ignored her, so LaTasha trained on her own at another track.
She only saw Graham at group meetings, and her workouts were designed
by Graham's assistant. But LaTasha would later find that she could not
escape the taint of her connection to Coach Graham. She would soon sorely
regret leaving Murfreesboro and Coach Hayes.
The new training in Raleigh was different and hard on LaTasha's weak
knees-the same knees that gave her problems in 2002 and 2003. In
October 2005, she underwent knee surgery at Duke Medical Center. Her
recovery from the surgery and slow return to training not only kept her away
from Coach Graham but also slowed her return to racing fitness and success
in the early U.S. outdoor season; she did not regain her speed until midseason and had few contacts with Coach Graham during her recovery.
However, one group meeting with Coach Graham caused her concern. At
that meeting, Coach Graham handed out a list of dietary supplements and
instructed everyone in the group to take them. All of the supplements were
available for purchase at stores like Vitamin World and GNC. Coach
Graham later asked for the lists back, but LaTasha kept her list. She
purchased the over-the-counter supplements and took them as directed.
After a mediocre U.S. outdoor season, LaTasha headed to the European
Circuit. She ran mid-level meets and gradually regained her form of 2001
and 2002. After winning the 100 meter sprint on July 22, 2006, at a meet in
Heusden, Belgium, she was told that she had to give a urine sample.' ° This
testing marked the beginning of the worst eighteen months of her life.
B.

The European Testing

LaTasha had been tested many times before, so she knew right
that the conditions of the sample collection site were not appropriate.
temperature at the testing facility was over ninety degrees, and the
where her sample was collected and stored was not air conditioned,

9.

Dick Patrick, Graham Can't Outrun Questions, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 2005, available at

http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/summer/2005-08-07-graham
10.

away
The
room
dirty,

USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at
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and smelled of urine. Furthermore, the room was filled with smoke, and the
Doping Control Officers smoked cigarettes as they collected samples. After
her sample was collected, it remained unrefrigerated for four days until it
was received by the WADA lab in Ghent, Belgium; these were prime
conditions for sample degradation or contamination.
On August 2, 2006, the Ghent Lab reported to the IAAF that LaTasha's
A-sample was positive for 7.8 ng/ml of nandrolone.'1 Nandrolone is a
naturally occurring anabolic androgen, and WADA established a
threshold-totals above the threshold are considered a doping violation. 2
The first threshold established by WADA was 5.0 ng/ml, which was later
lowered to 2.0 ng/ml.' 3 Certain conditions can naturally raise nandrolone
totals in women, such as pregnancy and oral contraceptives. 14 Bacterial
contamination can also cause increases in nandrolone counts.15 Nandrolone
has many times been the culprit in dietary supplement contamination. 16 In
fact, measurements of nandrolone below 50 ng/ml often indicate supplement
contamination. 17 Intentional use of nandrolone routinely results in totals in
the range of 100,000 ng/ml. 18 The margin of error for the Ghent Gas
Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) nandrolone test was 2.0
ng./ml.1 9

11. The report actually reported a positive for norandrosterone. Id. at 8. Norandrosterone is
a metabolite ofnandrolone. ld. at 9. The Cologne lab identified nandrolone on August 8. Id. at
11. The article will refer only to nandrolone, which refers to the results of all the reports.
12. World Anti Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code, The 2009 Prohibited List,
International
Standard,
http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/2009_Prohibited-List-ENG-Final20-Sept_08.pdf.
13. World Anti-Doping Agency, Technical Document TD 2004 NA, http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/nandrolone aug-04.pdf [hereinafter WADA TD 2004 NA].
14. See R.M. N. Kohler & M. I. Lambert, Urine Nandrolone Metabolites: False Positive
Doping Test?, BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 325, 326 (2002); see also WADA Technical Document TD
2004 NA, supra note 13, at 2.
15. See J. Delanghe, A Critical Investigation of the Genevieve Jeanson Case,
http://veloptimum.net/courses/athletes/Jeanson/E/6/DelangheReport.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
16. Don Catlin, et al., Trace Contamination of Over-the Counter Androstenedione and
Positive Urine Test Results for Nandrolone Metabolite, 284 JAMA 2618 (2000).
17. Testimony of Dr. David Black. See also Catlin, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. The standard of error is established by an acceptable range of z-scores, outlined in the
WADA International Standard for Laboratories, which requires a z-score of less than 2.0 ng/ml.
World Anti-Doping Agency, Int'l Standard for Laboratories § 3.5, at 85 (2009), http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/Intemational-Standard for Laboratories-v60_January_2009.pdf
[hereinafter WADA ISL 2009]. Furthermore, the minimum detection standard is established by
WADA for the testing labs; the standard sets the minimum amount of a Prohibited Substance that a
testing lab must be able to detect. World Anti-Doping Agency, Technical Document TD 2004

122
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Not until August 22, 2006, was LaTasha notified of the positive Asample test, and at that time she requested that the B-sample be tested.2 ° On
September 25th, she was notified that the B-sample was positive, a reading
of 12.3 ng/ml. 21 The difference between 7.8 ng/ml and 12.3 ng/ml is a
statistically significant 57% increase.22
About the same time that LaTasha was officially notified of the Asample results, they were leaked to the press in Europe. She was pelted by
questions from the press and linked to Coach Graham's other athletes that
had tested positive.2 3 Meet promoters immediately withheld prize money
she had earned, and Nike suspended its contract with her. In the United
States, test results cannot be released until the full results management
process is completed.24 In Europe, unfortunately leaks are common, despite
the rules.
Meanwhile, without her knowledge and without explanation, LaTasha's
A-sample, and later her B-sample, was sent to the Cologne WADA lab by
the IAAF for Isotope Ratio Mass Spectrometry (IRMS) testing. 25 IRMS
testing does not determine the quantity of a substance; rather, it determines
whether a substance is natural (endogenous) or artificial (exogenous).26 The
Cologne Lab's test of the A-sample showed the nandrolone to be artificial.27

MRPL, at 2, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/perflimits_2.pdf [hereinafter WADA
TD 2004 MRPL].
20. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 12 (2008).
21.
The Ghent lab reported its findings to USATF on September 21, and, on September 22,
USATF requested that USADA handle the test results under its Protocol. Id. at
13, 14.

22. When there is a measurement increase of this amount, it raises questions about the
precision of the measurement or the stability of the sample. We wondered if there was a growing
bacterial contamination. However, the lab documents reported that the PH levels were stable.
23.

Source: Another of Graham's Track Pupils Test Positivefor Steroids, USA TODAY, Aug.

25, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/summer/track/2006-08-24-jenkinsdoping.x.htm.
24. See U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Protocol for Olympic and Paralympic Movement Testing,
art.

16,

at

14

http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/policies

(2009),

available

procedures/usada protocol.pdf

at

[hereinafter

USADA Protocol 2009].
25. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 16.
26. World Anti-Doping Agency, Guideline: Reporting and Management of Elevated T/E

Ratios,
at
5,
http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/GuidelineReportingManagementElevatedTERatios.pdf
(A positive
IRMS result means that the nandrolone was of exogenous, artificial source). See also, WADA ISL
2009, supra note 19, § 5.4.4.4.1.2, at 58.
27. USADA v. Jenkins, AAANo. 30 1900019907, at 11.
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We at the clinic wondered if something had gone wrong at the Ghent lab,
something the Cologne lab testing was supposed to clean up.
After the Cologne A-sample test showed the nandrolone to be artificial,
and the initial B-sample results were back, LaTasha accepted a provisional
suspension on October 23, 2006.28 A bill for €250 accompanied the
notification of the positive B-sample. In Europe, the athlete has the burden
of paying for the evidence that may exonerate her, but that same evidence is
also necessary for convicting him or her. 29 Section 2.1.2 of the World AntiDoping Code states that proof of a doping offense requires either B-sample
confirmation of the A-sample testing, or an athlete's waiver of the B-sample
confirmation. 30 So we were quite perplexed by being asked to pay for the Bsample test. After some debate with USADA, and after we pointed out that
USADA Protocol 2004 § 8(c) states that USADA shall provide an athlete
with the B-sample documentation package set forth in Annex D, USADA
agreed to request and pay for the Cologne lab B-sample testing. 3' This
would be the first of many disputes over the production of documents in this
case. USADA requested IRMS testing on the B-sample, and received the
results from the Cologne laboratory on December 20, 2006.32 LaTasha
received notice of the IRMS positive (confirming artificial nandrolone) Bsample test on January 16, 2007. 3 3
C. Review Board and Discovery

It took some time to obtain all of the lab documents promised in
USADA Protocol 2004 Annexes C and D. It also took a lot of work to read
and understand the lab documents. As a pro bono clinic, we have limited
resources to hire experts. We often rely on University faculty to give us a
preliminary evaluation of lab documents, which they also provide pro
bono.34 In LaTasha's case, we had two sets of documents, one of GCMS
testing and one of IRMS testing. In addition to looking at documents from

28. Id. at 15.
29. World Anti-Doping Agency, Word Anti-Doping Code, art. 2.1.2, at 20 (2009),
http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/codev2009_En.pdf [hereinafter WADC 2009].
30. Id.
31. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing, art. 8(c), at 6 (2004),
http://videos.usoc.org/documentsnotices/protocol.pdf [hereinafter USADA Protocol 2004] (stating
that the USADA shall give the athlete the sample documentation package if the 'B' sample confirms
the 'A' sample).
32. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 16.
33. Id.
at 17.
34. We received invaluable help understanding the lab documents from Professor Jon Schoer
of Valparaiso University's Chemistry Department.
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two different testing procedures, a further difficulty lie in that parts of the
documents were in Flemish and parts in German. When the time came to
submit our arguments to the Review Board, we had only begun to
understand the very documents on which we were to argue. Our argument
to the Review Board focused on the problems during sample collection and
the possibility of contamination. But, we also asked for an investigation of
things we could not fully investigate ourselves, because of limits on
discovery. 5 The Review Board returned a finding of probable cause, as to
the possibility of doping, on February 14, 2007.
Review Boards are panels of three to five testing, medical, and legal
experts appointed by the Board of Directors of USADA to review doping
cases, at an early stage, to determine if sufficient probable cause exists to go
forward with formal doping charges.3 6 Written submissions are permitted,
but no oral presentation or arguments are allowed, and the identity of the
Review Board members is not made public.3 7 However, USADA knows
who sits on the Review Boards and has access to the submissions of athletes.
Some athletes' lawyers no longer participate in the Review Board process;
they see it as a black box fully controlled by USADA.
After the Review Board's finding, the arbitrator selection process began.
Then, surprisingly, we spotted newspaper reports of a Court for the
Arbitration of Sport (CAS) decision in which lab test results were excluded
because an International Standard for Laboratories (ISL) rule had been
violated.
That rule prohibited the same lab tech from handling or
manipulating both the A and B samples of an athlete. 39 That story rang
bells. We suspected that the same tech had been involved in both the A and
B sample testing, in both the Ghent and Cologne labs. But we were still
trying to determine the significance of that fact. We went in search of the
CAS opinion to learn the details and figure out if it had any relevance to
LaTasha's case. But the Landaluce case was nowhere to be found on the
35. We probably over estimated the role of the Review. We hoped that the Review Board
would conduct its own investigation of demand more information from the labs of USADA in
making its decision. However, the Review Boards function seems to be only to review the evidence
put in front of it.
36. USADA Protocol 2009, supra note 24, art. 1l(a), at 8.
37. Id., art. 1 (c), at 9.
38. UCI v. Landaluce & RFEC, TAS 2006/A/1119, at 20 (2006), available at
http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/CaseLaw/Shared%20Documents/ 1 19.pdf.
39. World Anti-Doping Agency, International Standards for Laboratories, § 5.2.4.3.2.2, at 20
(2004), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/lab-aug-04.pdf [hereinafter
WADA ISL 2004].

125
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CAS website. CAS only now accepts the idea that its decisions should be
available to the public, and in 2007, only some of its decisions were
available and those only for a short period of time. If the Landaluce
decision had been on CAS's website, it was only there for a short period of
time and in French. By the time we learned of the decision, it was nowhere
to be found. However, the decision seemed important, so we turned to the
informal system that athletes' lawyers had been using for some time to find
important arbitration decisions: we called around. Fortunately, Howard
Jacobs, probably the most experienced doping defense attorney in the world,
had a translated copy of the Landaluce decision, and he graciously sent it to
us.
We immediately read Landaluce and became giddy with the hope that it
created for winning LaTasha's case. In Landaluce, the same lab tech had
handled and manipulated the athletes A and B sample, a direct violation of
ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2.
Under the WADC burden shifting scheme, proof of an
ISL violation served to switch the burden to the prosecution to show that the
ISL violation did not undermine the validity of the lab results.4 1 Persuading
the fact finder of that negative is a heavy burden. The Landaluce panel
found that the prosecution could not prove that the samples
had not been
42
tampered with or adulterated, intentionally or accidentally.
The documents from both of LaTasha's lab reports showed that the
same technician worked on testing both the A and the B samples, but they
reportedly performed different tasks when testing the A-sample than when
testing the B-sample. From what we learned from the experts on campus,
the tasks performed on the A and the B samples, while different, both
involved handling and manipulating the sample: a violation of the Landaluce
panel's interpretation of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2. So, in the hope of ending the case
quickly, we wrote a letter to USADA requesting reconsideration of the
charges against LaTasha and resubmission of the case to the Review Board,
two reasonable requests in light of Landaluce. USADA declined, asserting
that the violation of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 should have been raised in January,
before the case went to the Review Board.

40. ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 reads: The 'B' sample confirmation must be performed in the same
laboratory as the 'A' sample confirmation. A different analyst must perform the 'B' analytical
procedure. The same individual(s) that performed the 'A' analysis may perform instrument set-up
and performance checks and verify results. WADA ISL 2004, supra note 39, § 5.2.4.3.2.2, at 20.
41. Id. § 2.0, at 7 (citing WADC § 3.2.1 (2003)) ("If the Athlete rebuts the presumption by
showing that a departure from the International Standard occurred, then the Anti-Doping
Organization shall have the burden to establish that such departure did not cause the Adverse
Analytical Finding.").
42. Landaluce & RFEC,TAS 2006/1/1119, at 21.
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Discouraged but not surprised by USADA's response, we set about
constructing an argument that the ISL had been violated and that the
violation undermined the reliability of the lab results. We knew that under
the current WADC once a violation of an ISL was proven, the burden shifted
to USADA to prove that the violation did not undermine the reliability of the
lab results. 43 However, we also knew from past cases that in reality we had
to prove the lab results were unreliable. Partly a function of the WADC
presumptions of laboratory compliance, 44 partly a function of the media
created presumption that all athletes take Performance Enhancing Drugs
(PEDs), partly a function of the mystique of scientists in white lab coats
(aided by television shows like CSI), and partly a function of the arbitrators
relative lack of experience with these technical, scientific questions, the lab
results were essentially seen as foolproof. Therefore, we had to prove two
elements: first, that although the lab conducted different procedures, each
procedure conducted by the lab technician in question involved handling and
manipulating the sample; second, that violation of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2
conclusively undermined the validity of all lab results. We needed more
details on the lab's procedures, namely the labs standard operating
procedures (SOPs), and the policy behind ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2.
Both ISL 7.1 and WADA Technical Document 2003 LDOC prohibit the
discovery of SOPs, a strange thing to find in rules designed for the
trustworthiness of lab results. 45 The prohibition seemed to be one more
example of WADA and the system insulating and protecting test results
from complete scrutiny. But, in our favor, rule R-18 of the Supplementary
Procedures, the procedural rules for doping arbitrations in the United States,
gave arbitrators the discretion to order the production of "documents and
other information. ' 46 So we asked USADA for the SOPs of both
laboratories. The response: No. The rules prohibit discovery of SOPs and
the SOPs are proprietary information, jealously guarded by each lab.
43. World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code, art. 3.2.1, at 13 (2003), available
at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/codev3.pdf [hereinafter WADC 2003].
44. The International Standard for Laboratories, 1.0 Introduction, Scope and References, in
part reads: Compliance with an International Standard (as opposed to another alternative standard,
practice or procedure) shall be sufficient to conclude that the procedures covered by the International
Standard were performed properly. WADA ISL 2004, supranote 39, art. 1.0, at 4.
45. Id. art. 7.1, at 46; see also WADA TD 2004 NA, supra note 13, at 2 (not requiring
reporting of anything beyond test results).
46. American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Procedures for the Arbitration of
Olympic Sport Doping Disputes, Rule 18 (2004), availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36205
(follow the link to R- 18) [hereinafter AAA Supplementary Procedures 2004].
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When the panel was assembled during the preliminary hearing, which is
primarily a phone conference to set a schedule for briefing and the hearing,
we renewed our request for the SOPs. Because USADA continued to refuse
production of the SOPs, we were forced to file a formal demand for
production. Essentially, we made a three-pronged argument for production
of the SOPs. First, we argued the need for the SOPs to understand the lab
documents in light of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2. Second, we contended we would be
unable to cross-examine USADA witnesses, particularly lab personnel,
without the SOPs. Third, we requested the exclusion of any USADA
witnesses or evidence of compliance with ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2, should the SOPs
not be produced. Surprisingly, the panel agreed with us and ordered the
production and translation of the SOPs. Still, USADA fought to limit the
production. The final order of production was issued on June 28, 2007, only
two weeks before the hearing dates. 47 The translations were done by the
same lab technicians accused of violating ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2.
D. American ArbitrationAssociation (AAA) Hearing

The full hearing was set for July 12 and 13, 2007, in Chapel Hill, North
Carolina.4 8 For the clinic members, July was a difficult time to hold the
hearing. Third year students who had graduated in May were studying for
the Bar Exam. Second year students were new to the case, joining the team
only in the late spring (to take over for graduating students unable to
continue into the summer). Brandon Sanchez and Rebecca Meyer were
carry-over third year students who had been working on the case since its
beginning. Mike Zonder and Kevin Huss were second year students doing a
quick study of the law and facts to prepare for the hearing. Despite these
difficulties, we were ready. We had written a thorough prehearing brief,
lined up one of the best experts in the field (Dr. David Black, testifying pro
bono), prepared three witness (LaTasha, Coach Dean Hayes, and Soubel Al
Awar, LaTasha's former employer), and quickly digested the laboratory
SOPs. Then, on July 6, 2007, out of the blue, the hearing was canceled. The
panel president, Mr.Yues Fortier, had to attend an emergency Board of
Directors meeting. As originally scheduled, the hearing was ten days short
of a full year since the sample was taken. Now rescheduled for October 29
and 30, 2007, 49 the case was likely to not come to a conclusion until
November 2007, at the earliest. Besides extending LaTasha's provisional
suspension, the delay forced the clinic to figure out who could carry on with
47.
48.
49.

USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at T 25 (2008).
Id. at T 26.
Id.
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the case. Each team member had developed a particular expertise that would
be very hard to convey. Luckily, Brandon and Rebecca were staying in the
area and could continue working on the case. However, the delay created
hardship for everyone in coordinating preparation.
Once the hearing convened, USADA put its case on first, even though it
had to call the two laboratory directors out of order on the second day
because of scheduling problems and the time difference with Europe. 50
They testified by phone. USADA satisfied its initial burden of proving an
"adverse analytical finding" by submitting the laboratory test results through
the testimony of Dr. Larry Bowers, USADA Senior Managing Director and
resident laboratory expert.5' USADA then turned to our ISL violation
arguments. Dr. Bowers testified that he participated in the drafting of ISL
5.2.4.3.2.2 and that the ISL should be interpreted to prohibit only the same
person from performing the same procedure on both the A-sample and the
B-sample.12 That testimony was followed by testimony on the reliability of
the IRMS testing, setting up the argument that even in the face of an ISL
violation, the IRMS results were impeachable. 53 Despite testifying about
how ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 should be liberally interpreted, on cross-examination
54
Dr. Bowers admitted that a literal violation of the rule occurred.
After Dr. Bowers testified, but before the lab directors testified, LaTasha
took the stand, so to speak. 55 She testified to the sample collection
problems, the supplements that she took, and the effect that the length of the
process had on her. USADA challenged her on cross-examination by
producing the packaging of one of the supplements she took, which
contained a statement on the packaging boasting that the supplement
stimulated the production of testosterone. USADA's hope was apparently to
either discredit LaTasha as either careless or characterize her as intentionally
seeking out PEDs. USADA also challenged LaTasha's testimony and our
argument of improper sample collection with testimony from two USADA
doping control officers. These challenges really shook LaTasha.

50. Id. at 34.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 42.
53. Id. at 47.
54. Id. at 45.
55. The hearing was held in a hotel conference room. There was a makeshift place in the front
of the room where live witnesses sat and the speaker phone was placed for testimony by phone.
There is no record of LaTasha's testimony in the AAA record other than a brief mention that she
testified.
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The second day of the hearing brought the critical testimony of the two
lab directors and Dr. Black. Both directors, Dr. William Schanzer of the
Cologne Laboratory and Dr. Franz Delbeke of the Ghent Laboratory,
testified to the procedures followed in their labs, the significance of the
documents and results in this case, and their compliance with ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2
and ISL 5.2.5.1.1,56 which reads: "A minimum of two certifying scientists
must independently review all Adverse Analytical Findings before a report
is issued. The review process shall be documented."57 Both Directors
pointed to lab documents with hand written initials, though there was no text
or statement of certification accompanying the initials. 8
On cross
examination, both lab directors testified that the rule encompassed in ISL
5.2.4.3.2.2 was unnecessary and an insult to the integrity of their labs and
lab personnel. They both opposed the rule and liberally interpreted it to only
prohibit the same person from performing the same task on both the Asample and the B-sample. 59 While the same lab technician may have
handled or manipulated both the A-sample and the B-sample, he had not
performed the same procedures on the A-sample and of the B-sample.60 We
also established that the lab technicians knew that they were working on the
B-samples of positive A-samples that they worked on.
Dr. Black followed the lab directors with testimony to the purpose of
ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 and the effect of an ISL violation. According to Dr. Black,
the purpose of the ISL was to protect from intentional and accidental errors
which would not be reported in lab documents. 6' Further, he testified that
the steps performed by the laboratory technicians in both labs on the Bsample did not come within the exception to the general rule of ISL
5.2.4.3.2.2 found in the last sentence of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2.62 That last sentence
reads: "The same individual(s) that perform the 'A' analysis may perform
instrument set up and performance checks and verify results. ' 6 3 That

56.

USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at

70; WADA ISL 2004, supra note 39,

§ 5.2.4.3.2.2, at 20, § 5.2.5.1.1, at 17.
57. WADA ISL 2004, supra note 39, § 5.2.1.1, at 17.
58. See USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 55. We made the argument in the
pre-hearing brief that ISL 5.2.5. 1.1 required a clear, separate statement from two scientists that they
had reviewed the lab documents and certified that the testing had been done properly. In both sets of
lab documents here there was, at the most, only one scientist's signature following any kind of
statement that a review had been done. According to the testimony of the lab directors, the second
certification was the initials of a staff member on the side of one of the lab documents. There was
certainly no statement of any kind accompanying the initials.
59. ld. at I 54.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 48.
62. Id.at 50.
63. WADA ISL 2004, supra note 39, § 5.2.4.3.2.2, at 20.
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testimony and the last sentence of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 would prove pivotal in the
outcome of the case.
Dr. Black was the last to testify, and the proofs were closed.
Surprisingly, and to USADA's great credit, there had been no attack on
LaTasha's connection with Coach Graham. The connection with Coach
Graham was mentioned, but not emphasized, and we were not sure why.
Nevertheless, closing arguments loomed. We had a closing prepared, but we
had the feeling that two of the arbitrators were impatient to end the hearing
and catch planes. Both parties were offered the choice of giving a very
short, ten minute closing, or submitting a written closing. We agreed with
USADA to submit, simultaneously, written closing arguments.64 That gave
us a chance to think through the questions that seemed to be troubling the
arbitrators.
Both parties submitted closing arguments, and the panel declared the
record closed on November 22, 2007.65
At this time, according to
Supplementary Procedure R-43, 66 an award must be made within ten days of
the closing of the record, and according to R-44,67 that award shall be
reasoned. However, in the place of a reasoned award within ten days, the
panel, as it had warned it might do, issued an "award" without reasoning
within the ten day mandate. Then two months after the record closed, the
panel issued a reasoned award. According to the panel's president, this is
common practice in commercial arbitration, particularly in Europe. The
award" was issued on December 12, 2007,68 and the reasoned award was
issued on January 25, 2008.69
On December 13 the headlines read: "U.S. Anti-Doping Agency Loses
Its First Case: Jenkins Found Not Guilty. 7 ° When we called LaTasha with

64. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 28.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Supplementary Procedure R-43 reads:
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator and, unless otherwise agreed by the
parties or specified by law, no later than 10 days from the date of closing the hearing, or,
if oral hearings have been waived, from the date of the AAA's transmittal of the final
statements and proofs to the arbitrator.
AAA Supplementary Procedures 2004, supra note 46, at Rule 43.
67. AAA Supplementary Procedures, Rule 44 reads: "Any award shall be in writing and
signed by a majority of the arbitrators. It shall be executed in the manner required by law. In all
cases, the arbitrator shall render a reasoned award." Id. at Rule 44.
68. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 31.
69. Id. at 162.
70. See Shipley, supra note 1.
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the news, all she could do was scream, "Oh my God, oh my God, oh my
God." It was a heady couple of days. No one had beaten USADA before.
We deliberated over what might happen next. Bill Bock, USADA's General
Counsel, graciously called to congratulate us. We warned LaTasha that the
case could be appealed.
The "award" was three sentences long. The panel found that ISL
5.2.4.3.2.2 had been violated, that USADA had failed to prove that the ISL
violation did not undermine the lab test results, and therefore, that USADA
had failed to prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the panel that a doping
violation had occurred. 7 The first question we had was whether this
triggered the start of the appeal periods. Also, we wondered whether
LaTasha's suspension was over, whether the "award" was reasoned enough,
and what we were to tell LaTasha.
The full, reasoned award came out six weeks later. The panel had
strictly construed ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 and agreed with us that it had a
prophylactic purpose. 72 But they broadly construed ISL 5.2.5.1.1. 73 The
panel wrote, "In view of the grave implications for athletes ...who are held
strictly to account for any transgression of applicable anti-doping rules,
testing laboratories must also be held strictly to account for any noncompliance with those same rules.

74

ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2 was critical to the

integrity of the lab's test results, and its breach could not be cured by
unsupported claims of innocence. The panel interpreted the first two
sentences of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2. to create a general prohibition, partly because
of the closed list of exceptions to the general rule found in the last sentence
of ISL 5.2.4.3.2.2.7' The panel further wrote:
USADA therefore has the burden of demonstrating to the Panel's comfortable
satisfaction that the violation of the standard in question did not cause the athlete's
adverse analytical finding. There are certain inherent difficulties
in discharging this
76
burden. First and foremost, it requires proof of a negative.

This panel, as unlikely as it seemed to us during the hearing, had

brought some balance back to the process.77

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
.76.
77.
that the

USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 159.
Id.at 135.
Id.at 139.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 123 (excepting instrument set up, performance checks, and results verification).
ld. at 151.
During Dr. Bower's testimony, we thought that the panel was very receptive to the claim
IRMS test was foolproof.
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E.

WADA Appeal

Was LaTasha now free to compete? An athlete had not prevailed
before, at least in the United States, so we were unsure whether she had to
wait until the end of the appeal process before she was eligible, whether she
would have to undergo reinstatement testing, and whether the meet promoter
would let her race, regardless of her win. LaTasha started training, but there
was doubt as to whether the process was finished. That doubt was
confirmed on February 20, 2008, when we received word, first from a
reporter, that WADA had appealed to CAS. LaTasha was angry and
devastated. She seriously considered giving up. She did not want to go
through a full hearing again. She had been forced to accept a life without
track by the year-and-one-half suspension; she was beaten down by the
process and hearing. LaTasha informed us that we had to find a way to do
the second hearing without her. We were now fighting for principle, not to
get LaTasha back on the track.
The first skirmish of the appeal centered on whether the appeal period
started with the December 12th "Award" or the January 25th Award and
Reasoning. We lost that one. t That loss gave us the feeling that we were
the visiting team and that the referees (CAS administrators at this point, the
panel had not yet been appointed) were being influenced by the cheering of
the home team. However, USADA was not taking part in the appeal.

78. There were two different and potentially applicable rules on the start and length of time to
appeal CAS. Code of Sports-Related Arbitration Rule 49 reads:
In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation,
association, or sports-related body concerned, or of a previous agreement, the time limit
for appeal shall be twenty-one (21) days from the receipt of the decision appealed
against. After having consulted the parties, the Division President may refuse to entertain
an appeal if it is manifestly late.
Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, Rule 49 (2004), http://www.tas-cas.org/rules (follow links to
Appeal, Arbitration Process) (emphasis added). International Association of Athletics Foundation
(IAAF) Rule 60 (25) reads: "Unless the Council determines otherwise, the appellant shall have thirty
(30) days from the date of communication of the written reasons of the decision to be appealed.., in
which to file his statement of appeal with CAS." Int'l Assoc. of Athletics Foundation, Rule 60(25),
availableat http://www.iaaf.org/aboutiaaf/publications/rules/index.htm. We argued that the IAAF
rule should be interpreted, in this case, in light of CAS Rule R-49 because of the exceptional nature
of this case. Those exceptional circumstances were that the athlete had already served the equal of a
year and one-half suspension (approaching the maximum suspension allowable if found guilty) and
that she had been found not guilty. Therefore, the appeal period should run from the date of the
December 12, 2007, "award" and would be considered manifestly late at this point. We stressed that
an appeal would, for all practical purposes, stretch the suspension to two years, and was thus abusive
and punitive in and of itself.
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Under CAS rules, an appellant must submit its appeal brief and list of
witnesses, along with a statement of those witnesses' expected testimony,

within ten days of the end of the appeal period.7 9 On March 14, 2008,
WADA filed a brief and a list of expected witnesses, but not a statement

from each witness. WADA was granted permission to file the statement of

Professor Ayotte at a later time.
WADA's brief brought no revelations, no arguments not raised by
USADA and no arguments not decided by the first panel. It appeared that
WADA was judge shopping.
WADA wanted non-North American
arbitrators to decide the case. While we waited for Professor Ayotte's
witness statement, we crafted new arguments to add to the successful ones
used in the first hearing. We rewrote the facts to emphasize the abusive
nature of the appeal as it pertained to LaTasha, and then we pled for
deference. We argued that WADA must meet a burden of proving that the

panel below had clearly made a mistake, akin to abusing its discretion.80 We
also argued that the new panel must not simply come to a different
conclusion, it must also find that the first decision was clearly wrong. We

were actually eager to argue for some level of deference that we believe the
system clearly needs.
WADA was having trouble getting Professor Ayotte's witness
statement, and it requested three time extensions. Then, out of the blue,

WADA withdrew its appeal. On April 14, 2008, WADA wrote CAS:
[H]aving carefully reviewed the full scientific data of this case, which includes materials
not available to us from the initial hearing, WADA has reached the conclusion that the
adverse analytical finding cannot lead to a sanction of Ms. Jenkins. The reasons for this
are other than the content of the appealed decision. 81

Did this mean that WADA had new, exculpatory evidence? Why did
WADA not turn this evidence over to us? We were anxious to know why
79. Code of Sports-Related Arbitration Rule 51 reads:
Within ten days following the expiration of the time limit for the appeal, the Appellant
shall file with the CAS a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal, together with all exhibits and specification of other evidence upon which he
intends to rely, failing which the appeal shall be deemed withdrawn. In his written
submission, the Appellant shall specify any witnesses and expert whom he intends to call
and state any other evidentiary measure which he requests. The witness statements, if
any, shall be filed together with the appeal brief, unless the President of the Panel decides
otherwise.
Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78, at Rule 51.
80. But see id. at Rule 57 (2004) (stating that the appeal panel has full power to review both
the facts and the law and come to a new decision if necessary, or refer the case back to the original
court for new deliberation).
81. Letter from World Anti-Doping Agency to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Apr. 14,
2008) (on file with author).
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WADA withdrew the appeal. Did it have to do with the statement of
Professor Ayotte? We would never officially know. But, some time later,
we would learn from Dr. Black that Professor Ayotte informed him that she
could not support WADA's appeal. On June 28, 2008, CAS issued a formal
termination order.
LaTasha did not want damages from WADA. We asked. She just
wanted it to be over. The case had brought the track years of her life to an
end. She did not want to relive any part of the end to those years. We
closed the file.

I1. THE LESSONS FROM USADA v. JENKINS
Our experience from LaTasha's case and several other cases, including
another unsuccessful WADA appeal in USADA v. Thompson,82 has revealed
the current system's many problems. A listing of the harm done to LaTasha
and the problems that we encountered in making her defense reveals the
system's flaws. An analysis of those problems reveals fundamental,
systemic causes of the problems that must be addressed to truly fix the
system.
A.

The Harm Done to LaTasha

The ultimate result of USADA v. Jenkins was that it ended LaTasha's
track career. In all practical effect, she was suspended from competition
from the time the A-sample lab report was leaked in August 2006, until
WADA withdrew its appeal in April 2008. That suspension kept her from
competing or training with any vigor for twenty months and killed any
chance of being ready for the coming 2008 Olympic season.
Her
endorsement contract was suspended and never reviewed. Prize money was
withheld and never paid to her. She endured twenty months of emotional
distress and her reputation was forever damaged. If the clinic had not taken
her case, her defense would have cost her thousands of dollars.

82. See WADA v. USADA & Thompson, CAS 2008/A/1490 (2008) (Carter, Arb.), available
at http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration -rulings/ThOMPSON%20(CAS).pdf;
see
USADA
v.
Thompson,
AAA
No.
52
190
00556
07
(2008),
available at

http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/arbitration-rulings/AAA%20CAS%2ODecision%20%20Eric52OThompson%2OJanuary%202008.pdf.
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B. Problems in Making LaTasha 's Defense
Though LaTasha won, we had to fight through many roadblocks to
make her case. Others have not been able to overcome many of these road
blocks. Below is a listing, in no specific order, of the problems that we
encountered in LaTasha's case and other cases.
1. Limits on Discovery
The World Anti-Doping Code (WADC), USADA Protocol, and
International Standards on Laboratories (ISL) limit the laboratory documents
that must be given to athletes. 83 For U.S. athletes, this limit begins with a
provision in the USADA Protocol that lists the lab documents that must be
provided to an athlete, and no more.84 USADA has maintained that it is not
obligated to provide any additional documents and the Protocol rule
specifically states that an athlete must pay for the production of additional
lab documents.85
This limit on lab documents in the Protocol is
supplemented by specific limits found 86
in the WADA Technical Documents,
like the prohibition on obtaining SOPs.
This limit on discovery is troubling because the critical evidence against
an athlete is being produced inside a lab to which an athlete has virtually no
access. 87 The reliability of the lab produced evidence depends on the care
and skill of the laboratory personnel to conduct the tests properly.
Procedures can be done improperly, either accidentally or intentionally, and
not corrected or noticed, despite failsafe back-ups. Those accidents will not
always show up in the documents. Further, though we hope this is never the
case, accidents can be covered up. It is human nature to avoid being called
out on a mistake, and when penalties loom, like job loss or lab
decertification (or just discredit), so do the incentives to cover up mistakes.

83. See WADC 2003, supra note 43; USDA Protocol 2009, supra note 24; WADA ISL 2004,
supranote 39.
84. USADA Protocol 2009, supra note 24, art. 9(c), at 6; see also USADA Protocol 2004,
supranote 31, art. 8(c), at 6.
85. Id.
86. WADA ISL2004, supra note 39, art. 7.1,at46; WADA TD 2004NA, supra note 13, at2.
87. While an athlete is allowed to send a representative to observe the B-sample testing, that is
an option rarely available to an athlete and when the 'B' process is observed, that observation is of
limited value. USADA Protocol 2009, supra note 24, at § 9(b). Athletes are for the most part
unable to send qualified observers to the B-sample testing because of the extreme expense of hiring
and paying the expenses of an expert. The process can easily cost thousands of dollars. Further, the
short time (everything is sent "promptly" according to Protocol requirements) between notification
of the 'A' positive and 'B' testing makes the logistics difficult. Then, in many cases, the athlete,
particularly the poor athletes, does not contact an attorney until after the B-sample has been tested.
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When the labs are shielded from full disclosure, athletes are left to the mercy
of lab mistakes.
2.

Inaccessibility of Foreign Evidence

Though inaccessibility to foreign evidence is a problem facing any party
in an international dispute, it is an acute problem for an athlete with little
resources going up against an accuser with worldwide reach and assets. The
problem is even more troubling in the context of a quasi-criminal process,
exacerbated by limited discovery rules. Witnesses and evidence are difficult
to find and expensive to track down. Evidence may be in foreign languages
and witnesses may not speak English.8 8 The ability to send a representative
to the testing of a B-sample can be practically unavailable.8 9 And this is all
compounded by the truth that the evidence is being created by the employees
of those prosecuting the athlete (at the very least, those teaming with those
prosecuting the athlete). Jeopardized parties may not want to help the
athlete prove that they produced bad evidence.
3.

Presumptions in Favor of Prosecution

The World Anti-Doping Code, USADA Protocol, and International
Standards create presumptions that sample collection and laboratory
procedures have been done in accordance with the International Standards. 9"
Both then and now, the International Standards are conclusively presumed to
be the best practice. 91 They cannot be challenged. 92 Ultimately, LaTasha
had the burden of proving a violation of an International Standard. Once
proven, the prosecution is permitted to counter with proof that the ISL
violation did not undermine the validity of the lab results. 93
These presumptions and burdens create practically unchallengeable lab
results. On top of this, the evidence that is needed to challenge these
presumptions is produced by and in the hands of the prosecution team,
which further limits the discovery of that information. In LaTasha's case,

88. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 26 (2008).
89. See id.
90. See WADC 2003, supra note 43, art. 3.2.1, at 13.
91. Id. See also WADC 2009, supra note 29, art. 3.2.1, at 27.
92. See USADA v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 00847 06, at 151 (2007).
93. WADC 2003, supra note 43, art. 3.2.1, at 13. However, the 2009 version of the WADC
has changed the burden placed upon the athlete.
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we had to fight very hard for that evidence. Now, to increase the
prosecution's chances, WADA has changed the burdens. Under the current
WADC an athlete must prove both a departure from the ISL and that the
departure likely caused the positive result. 94 This rule dramatically increases
the burden on the athlete and makes the lab results conclusive and
practically unchallengeable. That is an exhibition of unchecked power.
4. Precedent Not Readily Available
CAS does not publish all of its decisions; it publishes only those
decisions it believes are important. 95 Until recently, decisions were only
available on its website for a limited period of time. It is now creating an
archive of case decisions. 96 But at last check, the archive was not working.
On the other hand, USADA makes all AAA-CAS decisions available on its
website. 97
AAA-CAS and CAS arbitrations recognize precedent. 98 Precedent is
critical in preparing a case and advising an athlete. If we had not found the
Landaluce decision, LaTasha would not have won. The Sports Law Clinic
now maintains an online database of all available CAS, AAA-CAS, and
International Federation arbitration decisions.
It can be found at:
www.sportslawclinic.org.
C.

Specific System Weakness

In addition to the problems that we encountered in making LaTasha's
defense, we encountered other problems that slowed the case or otherwise
created problems or doubt about the system. Those problems are listed
below, in no specific order.

94. Now, in addition to proving a departure from the International Standard, the athlete must
prove that the departure "could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical Finding." WADC
2009, supra note 29, art. 3.2.1, at 27.
95. See Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS General Information, http://www.tascas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-229-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
96. See Court of Arbitration for Sport, Database of CAS Awards, http://www.tascas.org/jurisprudence-archives (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
97. See
U.S.
Anti-Doping
Agency,
Arbitration
Results,
http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2009).
98. See, e.g., USADA v. Hardy, AAA No. 77 190 00288 08, at 7.39 (2009) ("This Panel's
decision is guided by CAS precedent and the CAS precedent to which we look applies Swiss law.").
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1. Time Limits, Controls On The Over-All Process, Or Steps In The
Process Are Inadequate And Not Rigorously Enforced.
The only time limits or control placed on the results management
process, or the arbitration process, are the three month limit in the
Supplementary Procedures,99 and the appeal and briefing time limits found
in the CAS appeal rules.' 00 Further, as in LaTasha's case, those limits are
not strictly enforced. Additionally, there are no time limits before a panel is
created. The progress of a case is within the control of USADA from the
time that the lab results are reported until a panel is assembled. However,
time constraints exist in the new USADA Protocol, if the athlete is
scheduled to compete in a protected competition or the trial for a protected
competition. O' But if the athlete has accepted a provisional
suspension,
02
time constraints are not triggered until a panel is assembled.
2.

Sample Testing Time Limits Are Inadequate And Not Rigorously
Enforced.

While the USADA Protocol contains a time limit of three months for the
reporting analytical results,' 03 that time limit is too generous, particularly for°
a B-sample test, and it is not enforceable outside of the United States.' 0
The 2004 ISL 5.2.4.3.2.1, states that the 'B' sample analysis should be
completed within thirty days of notification of an 'A' sample positive.' 5
But there is no enforcement mechanism for this standard, and it is routinely
ignored. Further, the new ISL 5.2.4.3.2.1 states "The B Sample analysis...
shall take place no later than seven (7) working days following notification
of an A Sample Adverse Analytical Finding by the Laboratory."' 1 6 But that
same ISL excuses a delay
caused by logistical reasons and contains no
07
enforcement mechanism. 1

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

AAA Supplementary Procedure 2004, supra note 46, at Rule 24.
See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78, at Rule 49, 51, 55, 59.
See USADA Protocol 2009, supra note 24, arts. 14-15, at 13.
USADA Protocol 2004, supra note 3 1, art. 12, at II.
Id. art 7(a), at 4.
WADA ISL 2009, supra note 19, art. 5.2.2.6, at 35.
WADA ISL 2004, supra note 39, art. 5.2.4.3.2.1, at 20.
WADA ISL 2009, supranote 19, art. 5.2.4.3.2.1, at 41.
Id.
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3.

Arbitrators Are Not Fully Dedicated To Hearing Cases.

Arbitrators hear cases as a second job or on a part time basis. Therefore,
their other work demands can interfere with the progress of the doping
arbitration by slowing the case down or even drawing the arbitrator's
attention away from the case. Part time arbitrators can also be inexperienced
in the rules and laws of doping matters. That inexperience can cause many
problems, including a higher likelihood of being influenced by more
experienced arbitrators.
4. Arbitrators Are Allowed To Serve Both As Arbitrators And As
Counsel To Governing Bodies And Athletes.
The Code of Sports-Related Arbitration contains no prohibition against
arbitrators also representing athletes or sports governing bodies in CAS
proceedings. 108 Unfortunately, this leads to cases in which arbitrators sit in
judgment of their former or future clients. Those clients are often sports
governing bodies. Also, though an arbitrator may not have represented the
governing body appearing before him or her, if the arbitrator has or will
represent other governing bodies, particularly in doping matters, there is a
unity of interest between governing bodies such that creates a conflict of
interest. While the CAS Code permits challenges to an arbitrator's
independence,' 0 9 a party, most certainly an athlete, is loath to bring a
challenge for fear of the ramifications in that case or future cases. At the
CAS level, arbitrators are informed of a challenge and the identity of the
party bringing the challenge. "0 While the arbitrators at the AAA-CAS level
are not, according to the rules and practice, informed of the identity of a
party challenging an arbitrator's independence, the rules do not prohibit
notification. 1 1
5. The Appointment Of Arbitrators By The Parties Creates The
Possibility And Appearance Of Partiality. 112
At the CAS level, and possibly at the AAA-CAS level, arbitrators are
aware of which party appointed them. Even if arbitrators are not directly

See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78.
Id. at Rule 34.
Id. at Rule 34 (allowing the challenged arbitrator to respond to the claim of conflict).
See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78.
See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I
EMP. RTS & EMPLOYMENT POL'Y J. 189, 190-194 (1997).
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
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informed, they can easily surmise which party appointed them. This
knowledge can create the repeat performer phenomenon, which suggests that
arbitrators will subconsciously rule in a way that favors their reappointment
in future cases. Arbitrators may behave this way when reappointment means
being paid, by the hour, for hearing another case.
6.

The De Novo Appeal Process Prolongs And Significantly Increases
The Cost Of The Process.

All appeals within the CAS system are reviewed de novo.l13 Repeating
the hearing a second time prolongs the appeal as compared to an appeal on
the record. A second full hearing, with all the costs of the first hearing
repeated, is more expensive than an appeal on the record. When an athlete
was successful at the first hearing, a de novo appeal, in fact any type of
appeal, will prolong the de facto suspension. Therefore, the longer the
appeal takes the longer the athlete continues to be punished despite an initial
acquittal.
7.

The De Novo Appeal Process Allows Judge Shopping.

The de novo appeal standard allows any party to completely repeat the
same arguments and presentations it made in the first hearing, without
having to show any errors or irregularities from the first hearing." 4 This is
the proverbial second bite of the apple. There is no need to raise new
arguments or issues. The losing party can repeat its case to a new set of
arbitrators. This judge shopping is made worse when parties that did not
participate in the first hearing, but are in privity with the losing party, have
standing to appeal. These new parties can appeal capriciously, as in
LaTasha's case.
8.

There Is No Obligation To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence.

As private, commercial arbitration, the prosecution in doping cases is
under no obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense." 5 This

113. Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78, at Rule 57 (stating that the court can
review all the law and the facts).
114. See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supranote 78, at Rule 57, 58.
115. Seeid. atRule56.
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is particularly troubling when the critical evidence is produced by the
prosecution's partners, namely the laboratories. When the burden is placed
upon the athlete to prove a violation of laboratory procedures, full disclosure
of all evidence, particularly potentially exculpatory evidence is necessary.
D. Big PictureLessons

An analysis of the harm done to LaTasha, the problems that we
encountered in making LaTasha's defense, and the system's other flaws
reveals three systemic problems. The dominant conclusion is that a dramatic
imbalance of power exists between those who make the rules and those who
are subject to the rules. That imbalance of power in turn allows the other
two problems to exist. The second problem is the mischaracterization of the
legal nature of the relationship between the prosecutors in doping cases and
the defendant: athletes. The legal relationship is not a dispute between
members of a voluntary association, governed by concepts of contract law,
as the prosecution insists that it is. In reality, a doping allegation is a
disciplinary proceeding of a quasi-criminal character, and demands different
treatment from civil disputants. The third problem is the use of the wrong
model of dispute settlement to decide doping charges. Arbitration in
general, and certainly commercial arbitration or arbitration based on the
commercial arbitration model, fails to protect the weaker party (here
athletes), and fails to protect their basic due process rights. The commercial
arbitration model, besides characterizing disputes as a matter of the law of
association, only serves to allow the dominant party to dictate to the
subordinate party.
What follows is an analysis of this thesis and some suggestions for
improving the system.
IV. WHO MAKES

THE RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION

It is often said, by prosecutors in doping cases, that athletes voluntarily
accept the rules that they are now being judged by when they become
members of the governing body for their sport. Therefore, the argument
proceeds, because athletes voluntarily accepted these rules, they must agree
with them and cannot contest their application. However, if association with
the governing body is truly a voluntary association, it is only fair to ask how
the rules are made, who makes the rules, and whether an athlete has a choice
in deciding to join the association. An examination of the process of rule
making is a true assessment of the relative power relationship between the
members of the association and the rights of the individual members of that
association.
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A.

The World Anti-Doping Code

The World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) is the fundamental source of
rules that govern a doping charge. All international sports federations, all

national governing bodies, and all national anti-doping agencies within the
Olympic Movement must incorporate in their rules the mandatory provisions
of the WADC. 116 These mandatory provisions create the basic structure of
the testing process (i.e., sample collection), the laboratory analysis process,
the results management process (i.e., adjudication system, including burdens
and presumptions), and the punishment." 7 While individual International
Federations and National Anti-Doping Organizations can add to the structure
created by the mandatory provisions of the WADC, they cannot add features

that conflict with the mandatory provisions. "'
The WADC was recently redrafted, and went into effect on January 1,
2009.119 The redraft of the WADC started with the appointment of a Code

Project Team by the Executive Committee of WADA. 2 0 The Code Project
12
Team was composed of WADA staff members and two outside experts.

1

The Code Project Team produced a draft code which was opened to
comment from "stakeholders" during three consultative phases.
Stakeholders were broadly defined to the point of allowing anyone to offer

suggestions and comment for a new code. 2 2 After the consultative phase
was finished, the Code Project Team submitted a "final" draft of the new
code, Version 3.0, to the World Conference on Doping in Sport for debate
and approval. After approval by the attendees at the World Conference on

116. WADC 2003, supra note 43, at Introduction; see also WADC 2009, supra note 29, at
Introduction.
117. Id. at Table of Contents.
118. Id. at Introduction. The USADA Protocol expands upon the mandatory provisions of the
WADC; the Protocol specifically adds procedural detail and addresses requirements of the Amateur
Sports Act. See USADA Protocol 2009, supranote 24.
119. See WADC 2009, supra note 29.
120. See
WADA,
1st
Consultation
Phase,
http://www.wadaama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=656 (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) [hereinafter WADA 1st
Consult]; WADA, Play True Q & A: 2009 Code (January 1, 2009), http://www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/QA_2009_Codeed.pdf [hereinafter WADA 2009 Q&A] (referring to
"an expert project management team which was overseen by the WADA's executive committee").
121. The Code Project Team that drafted the 2003 WADC and the 2009 WADC was headed by
Mr. Richard Young, a member of the Colorado Springs firm Holme, Roberts and Owen. Mr. Young
was the lead USADA Counsel in USADA v. Landis.
122. See WADA 2009 Q&A, supra note 120.
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Doping in Sport, the 3.0 Code was approved by a unanimous
vote of the
23
WADA Foundation Board and WADA Executive Committee. 1
An analysis of the drafting and approval process shows that it is
controlled by WADA. The decision on who will control the drafting process
(the members of the Code Project Team), is made by the WADA Executive
Committee. 124 The majority of the Code Project Team was comprised of
WADA employees. The final decision on the Code is made by the WADA
Foundation Board. The Foundation Board's members are all appointed by
the International Olympic Committee and governments. 125 Any athletes or
former athletes involved must be vetted and appointed by the International
Olympic Committee or governments, and any suggestions for the Code from
athletes are ultimately evaluated by and decided upon by bodies composed
of WADA representatives.1 2 6 Athletes' concerns and interests were not
represented with any rigor or bargaining power during the drafting of the
Code.
WADA's dominance in drafting the Code can be seen in the changed
burdens contained in the new 2009 Code. Under the 2003 Code (i.e.,
Version 2.0) WADA accredited laboratories were presumed to have
complied with the ISL standards when testing athlete's samples for banded
substances. 21 7 International standards in the ISL are basic operating rules for
accredited laboratories.12 Athletes who challenge compliance with the ISL
bore the burden of proving a violation by a balance of probabilities.1 2 9 If a
violation was proven by an athlete, the burden then shifted to the prosecution
to prove that the ISL violation did not undermine the reliability of the
positive test result.130 However, now under the 2009 Code (i.e.,Version 3.0),
the athlete bears the dual burden of not only proving a violation of the ISL,
but also proving that the departure "could reasonably have caused the

123. Seeid.
124. See
SIRC,
A
GUIDE
TO
THE
CODE
(2007),
available
at
http://www.sirc.ca/newsletters/november07/documents/s-1 045684.pdf.
125. See World Anti-Doping Agency, Governance, Introduction, http://www.wadaama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=296 (last visited Oct. 17, 2009); Constitutive Instrument
of Foundation of the Agence Mondiale Antidopage, art. 6 (Mar. 2008), http:///www.wadaama.org/rtecontent/document/constitutive-instrumentfoundation.pdf.
126. See World Anti-Doping Agency, Governance, Athlete Committee, http://www.wadaama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=291 (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) (stating that members of
this committee provide insight into athletes' roles in raising anti-doping awareness and emphasizing
their role of providing feedback to government leaders about anti-doping initiatives).
127. See WADC 2003, supra note 43, art. 3.2.1, at 13.
128. See WADA ISL 2009, supra note 19, art. 1.0, at 75.
129. WADC 2003, supra note 43, art. 3.2.1, at 13.
130. Id.
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Adverse Analytical Finding."' 3 ' The change in the burden shifting scheme
certainly increased the burden on the athlete and will allow labs to be more
lax in their compliance with the international standards.
Code of Sports-RelatedArbitration

B.

CAS doping arbitrations are procedurally governed by a combination of
applicable International Federation provisions and the Code of SportsFor the most part, International
Related Arbitration (CAS Code).' 32
Federation rules include the mandatory provisions of the WADC, and
beyond those provisions, little more than time limits for appeals.' 33 One of
the mandatory provisions of the WADC requires that each International
Federation allow for appeals to CAS. The majority of procedural rules, such
as arbitrator selections, appeal standards, and hearing rules are contained in
the CAS Code. 3 4 The current CAS Code was drafted and is amended by the
International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS), which is heavily
dominated by members appointed by Olympic Movement governing bodies
like the International Olympic Committee, International Federations, and
National Olympic Committees.' 35 Consequently, all of the arbitration rules
have been drafted by the representatives of the Olympic Movement
governing bodies with little input from athletes.
C. USADA Protocoland Supplementary Procedures
Doping prosecutions in the United States are governed by the rule of the
applicable International Federation, the USADA Protocol, and the
In the event of a conflict between the
Supplementary Procedures.
International Federation rules and the USADA Protocol, the Protocol

131.

WADC 2009, supranote 29, art. 3.2.1, at 27.

132.
133.

Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78, at Rule 26.
See generally id.

134.

See generally Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, supra note 78.

135. See Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, Statutes S4, http://www.tas-cas.org/statutes
(follow the link to "Composition" under ICAS). ICAS is composed of twenty (20) members. Id.
Four members are appointed by the International Federations. Id. at Statute 4(a). Four members are
appointed by the National Olympic Committees. Id. at S4(b). Four members are appointed by the
International Olympic Committees. Id. at Statute 4(c). Four members are appointed by the twelve
members appointed by the International Federations, NOCs, and IOC with a view of safeguarding
athletes' interests. Id. at Statute 4(d). Four members are appointed by the other sixteen members.

Id. at Statute 4(e).
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controls. 13 6

The USADA Protocol, both the first version and the recent
redraft, effective January 1, 2009, was drafted by USADA and USOC
staff.'37 While the first version of the Protocol was presented to the USOC
Athlete's Advisory Council, the recent redraft was not. 138
The
Supplementary Procedures are modifications of the American Arbitration
Association Commercial Arbitration rules. 3 9 The procedures govern the

arbitration process and were drafted, presumptively, by the same people that
drafted the Protocol, with little to no athlete involvement.
V.

LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS

The legal relationship between athletes and sports governing bodies is
routinely described as that of a voluntary association, and thus governed by
the law of associations. CAS jurisprudence recognizes the relationship as a
voluntary association, and therefore membership in the association is
governed by the rules and bylaws of the association. 140 Further, CAS panels
and domestic courts (here the courts of Switzerland and the United States)
conclude that the voluntary nature of membership in such an association
gives rise to a presumption that the member choosing to join has knowledge
and understanding of the bylaws and terms to which she consents to be

bound. 141 Such Associations are considered independent, as their internal
affairs and management are governed by the association's constitution and
bylaws. 142 Internal association decisions, including disciplinary proceedings

136. See USADA Protocol 2009, supra note 24, art. 3(d), at 3.
137. Telephone Interview with John Ruger, USOC Ombudsman (February 2009); see also
USADA
2007
Annual
Report,
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/who/annual report-2007.pdf.
138. Telephone Interview with John Ruger, USOC Ombudsman (March 2009).
139. See American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Procedures for the Arbitration of
Olympic Sports Doping Disputes Rule 1, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28627#l (last visited Oct.
17, 2009) [hereinafter AAA Supplementary Procedures 2009]; see also Delanghe, supra note 15.
140. See Arbitration CAS 2005/A/830, Squizzato v. FINA, award of 15 July 2005, at 13;
Arbitration CAS 2002/A/382, UCS v. RLVB, award of 24 June 2002, at 329.
141. See Arbitration CAS 2005/A/830, Squizzato v. FINA, at 13; Arbitration CAS 2002/A/382,
UCS v. RLVB, at 329; Arbitration CAS 2005/A/847, H.Knauss v. FIS, award of 20 July 2005;
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); Pharmacists & Retail Drug Store
Emp. Union, Local 330 v. Lake Hills Drug Co., 255 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1964); Robinson v.
Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. II1. 1956); NCAA v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
142. See, e.g. Tucker v. Nat'l Ass'n of Postal Supervisors, 790 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
2003) (holding that a court should not intervene in the private internal dispute of an association
"unless there is a showing of fraud, arbitrariness, or collusion"); see also Ind. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. 1997) (holding that a court will not intervene in a
dispute between a state high school athletic association and a member school unless fraud or some
other abuse of a civil or property right has occurred).
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by the association against a member, are protected by a long143 standing
judicial policy of non-inference, but for a few rare circumstances.
CAS panels, though given the authority to review de novo the
disciplinary decisions of private associations, often limit themselves by
applying the doctrines of association independence and non-interference in
their review of doping decisions. 44 Panels will freely review the facts and
the application of the association's rules to the facts, but they will not review
or pass judgment on the rules of the association itself. 145 Therefore, the
ultimate result of characterizing the legal relationship between athletes and
sports governing bodies through the doctrines of the law of voluntary
associations, is that athletes are powerless to challenge the rules made by the
sports governing bodies. The governing rules are created without the input
of athletes. Thus, the substantive and procedural rights afforded athletes are
only those granted by the governing bodies and doping charges are viewed
merely as breach of contract claims, and little more.
But is the fundamental assumption here correct? Is this a voluntary
association? Do athletes voluntarily join these associations and voluntarily
accept these rules? Can these legal fictions be sustained when: there is no
alternative association to join, there is no bargaining, and there is no say in
creating the rules of the association? Further, should the fiction continue
when membership in the association is necessary for the athletes to earn a
living at their chosen profession? 46 Ultimately, it must be asked, is a
monopolistic sports association that regulates how and when athletes can
earn a living a voluntary association in the traditional sense, or is it
something more, and should the relationship between athletes and governing
bodies be treated differently than a mere membership in a voluntary
association?

143. See Arbitration CAS 2005/A/830, Squizzato v. FINA, award of 15 July 2005.
144. See supra notes 142, 143.
145. See, e.g. USADA v. Jenkins, AAA No. 30 190 00199 07, at 108, 111 (2008).
146. The common reply to the point that athletes earn their living as athletes is that participation
is a privilege or that athletes can just go out and get a "real job." In the modem sports world there
has never been a more ridiculous argument than that common reply. Successful modem athletes
must devote their entire life to training. It is a full-time job. It is like any other profession or job and
should be treated as such. Not as a privilege, which is granted at the whim of the sports aristocracy.
Athletes are equal partners in staging sporting shows and spectacles like the Olympics. They should
be treated as equals, not serfs.
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VI. COMPARISON TO PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND QUASI-CRIMINAL
STANDARDS

What is the true nature of doping charges and doping proceedings? If
they are not truly matters of contract law and the law of associations, what
are they? The legal nature of doping charges is fundamental to determining
the quantity and quality of procedural protections afforded defendants.
It is quite clear that doping charges are, at the least, disciplinary actions.
Even a cursory comparison with other types of disciplinary actions-such as
attorney discipline, medical discipline, military discipline, or educational
discipline-shows that doping charges fall within the larger category of
disciplinary law. Quite telling, the WADC has adopted a burden of proof in
doping cases it describes as those used in professional discipline
proceedings. 47 Though not widely recognized in the United States,
European jurisprudence recognizes the separate and distinct body of
disciplinary law. 148 All disciplinary actions are recognized as demanding
more procedural protections than are accorded parties to a simple contract
dispute. 149 But the quantity and quality of those protections varies
depending on the closeness of the discipline to criminal matters. 50
In early CAS jurisprudence there was a debate over whether doping
charges were quasi-criminal in nature."'5 That debate, using the term quasicriminal as a touchstone, was largely about the procedural rights of accused
athletes. 152 Once athletes were afforded basic procedural rights, the debate
faded, and those arbitrators who characterized doping as a matter of the law
of associations carried the day. The doctrine of non-interference was now
used to defer to the rules of the associations and claims that proceedings
were quasi-criminal were no longer made."' Unfortunately, during that
short-lived debate, no tests or standards were adopted or created for
determining whether doping charges were quasi-criminal.
147.
148.

See WADC 2009, supra note 29, art. 3.1 cmt., at 26.
See Mario Chiavario, Principles of Criminal Procedure and Their Application in

DisciplinaryProceedings,72

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL

721 (2001).

149. See id. at 723-24.
150. See id. at 722-23.
151. CAS and AAA/CAS decisions finding doping matters to be quasi-criminal include:
Arbitration CAS 2002/A/432, Demetis v. FINA; AAA-CAS No. 30 190 00291 03, USADA v.
Vencill, award of 24 July 2003. CAS and AAA/CAS decisions finding doping matters to be noncriminal in nature include: CAS 98/208, N.J.Y.W. v. FINA, award of 22 Dec. 1998; AAA-CAS No.
30 190 00012 02, Blackwelder v. USADA, award of 17 May 2002.
152. See AAA-CAS No. 30 190 00012 02, Blackwelder v. USADA, award of 17 May 2002, at
8.
153. See Richard H. McLaren, Introducing the Court of Arbitration for Sport: The Ad Hoc
Divisionat the Olympic Games, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 515, 533 (2001).
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Surprisingly, there is a good deal of agreement between European and
U.S. jurisprudence on the question of whether, and to what degree, criminal
procedures should be made part of the disciplinary proceeding. 5 4 Both
systems look to three factors: (1) the punitive nature of the punishment, (2)
the effort to deter, and (3) the aim to protect the public.155 The case law of
the European Court of Human Rights requires that certain minimum
guarantees found in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms be followed in disciplinary proceedings when
the seriousness of the punishment and deterrence imposed equals criminal

proceedings.

156

In the United States, disciplinary proceedings are considered criminal
enough in character to necessitate enhanced procedural protections when:
the accuser brings charges to protect the public, and the consequences
sought are punitive.157 Therefore, we must examine the nature, effect, and
severity of doping punishments.
The punishment for committing a doping offense is much more than
being suspended from or being kicked out of a voluntary association. Under
the mandatory provisions of the WADC, the punishments that await an
athlete upon finding of a doping violation are:
(1)Suspension from competition two years to life.158
(2) Disqualification of results. 159160
(3) Repayment of prize money.
(4) Suspension National Governing Body Financial Support. 161
(5) Ban from organized practices. 162

(6) Fines. 163
(7)Public Report of Punishment. 164

154. Compare In Re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824 (Wash. 1958), with Daphne Boiten, Nico Jorg &
Johannes Nijboer, The Netherlands Principles of Criminal Procedure and Their Application in
Disciplinary Proceedings, 74 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL 1007 (2003).

155. See In Re Kindschi, 319 P.2d at 825-26; Boiten, Jorg, Nijboer, supra note 154, at 1086-87.
156. See id. at 1085-86.
157. See In Re Kindschi, 319 P.2d at 825-26.
158. WADC 2009, supra note 29, art. 10.2, at 52.
159. Id. art. 10.1, at 52 (if the violation is in connection with an event).
160. Id. art. 10.8.1, at 71 (requiring an athlete to repay prize money forfeited under the WADC
in order to be reinstated).
161. Id. art. 10.10.3, at 75.
162.

Id. art. 10.10.1, at 74.

163.

Id. art. 10.12, at 76.
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The effect of these punishments for the athlete is that the athlete may not
earn her livelihood in the profession for which she trained; she will lose any
endorsement contract that she has; and, she will be suspended from her team
and lose any salary associated with team membership. For all athletes,
regardless of their level, punishment means permanent damage to their
reputation and future earning ability.
These punishments are certainly punitive. Suspensions, fines, and the
taking of financial support from National Governing Bodies are clearly
designed to punish wrongful behavior. It is certainly more than the
consequential damages approach to measuring contract damages. If the
damages sought were consequential in nature, they would be limited to the
disqualification of results, not future punishment. These punishments are
designed to deter both the convicted athlete and other athletes. Convicted
athletes are suspended and thereby deterred from doping for a period of
time. Other athletes are deterred by the publication of convictions. Finally,
the public is protected when (1) results are voided, (2) athletes are suspended
and thereby kept from defrauding other athletes and fans, and (3) when the
convictions are made public.
While the punishment for a doping offense under the WADC is severe
enough to make the process criminal in nature, the possibility of actual
criminal charges resulting from a doping charge further warrant enhanced
procedural protections. The first risk of criminal charges comes from the
possibility of testing positive in one of the growing number of countries that
have criminalized the use or possession of prohibited substances. 65 Even
though the WADC allows the doping prosecution to be carried out by the
National Anti-Doping Organization of the athlete's home country, the
WADC prosecution will not automatically replace or bar a criminal
prosecution in the country of testing. 166 As long as the country of testing has
jurisdiction and can either extradite the athlete or try the athlete in absentia,
the athlete is at risk. Additionally, there is a risk that evidence developed
during a WADC prosecution could find its67 way into the hands of criminal
prosecutors of the athlete's home country. 1

164. USADA Protocol 2009, supra note 24, art. 16, at 14 (limited to after the violation has been
confirmed through Protocol procedures).
165. Doping is now a crime in Italy, France, Austria, and China. See Cyclist Arrested in
Austria,
ESPN.coM,
Mar.
20,
2009,
available
at
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=4000571; Spain Won't Allow Use of Evidence,
ESPN.cOM,
Feb.
18,
2009,
available
at
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/cycling/news/story?id=3916207.
166. WADC 2009, supra note 29, art. 20.5, at 110.
167. It is possible that evidence obtained in an Olympic Movement doping investigation could
be subpoenaed by prosecutors or voluntarily turned over to prosecutors by Olympic Movement
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The second risk of criminal prosecution could come from information
sharing under the recent agreement between WADA and Interpol1 68 or the
sharing of information under the terms of the International Convention
Against Doping in Sport. 169 All National Anti-Doping Organizations and
National Governing Bodies are required to inform WADA about their
doping prosecutions. 170
It is possible that WADA could pass such
information on to Interpol or another country for investigation and
prosecution. The provisions of the International Convention could obligate
USADA to share information with governments that could prosecute
athletes. 171
Therefore, an analysis of the consequences of a doping charge shows
that doping charges are not only disciplinary in their legal nature, but
criminal enough in character to necessitate significant quasi-criminal
procedural protections. The serious nature of doping charges and the need
for the protective procedures of criminal proceedings can be most
appreciated by looking at what happens to an athlete that is charged with a
doping offense and later cleared. LaTasha Jenkins needed the protections of
the criminal system to protect her from being punished, even though she was
not found guilty.
VII. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MODEL

Does the current arbitration system used in doping cases work
considering the true nature of doping charges? The current arbitration

investigators. But what is more alarming is the fact that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections do
not apply to the gathering of evidence in Olympic Movement doping investigations, since
investigators are not state actors.
However, the evidence could be admissible in criminal
prosecutions because the evidence was gathered by a non-government official, and is thus good
"evidentiary fruit" even if gathered in violation of constitutional protections.
168. See Interpol, WADA Joins Forcesto Fight Doping, ESPN.cOM, Feb. 2, 2009, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/news/story?id=3878934.
169. See International Convention Against Doping in Sport, arts 3(c), 13, 14, 16(d), Oct. 19,
2005, UNESCO, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001425m.pdf;
Michael
Straubel, The InternationalConvention Against Doping in Sport: Is It the Missing Link to USADA
Being a State Actor and WADC Coverage of U.S. Pro Athletes?, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 63
(2008).

170. WADC 2009, supra note 29, art. 14.2.2, at 86 (requiring organizations who decide an antidoping case to publically report the decision within twenty days).
171. See Straubel, supra note 169.

151

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010

33

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 5

system is based on traditional commercial arbitration processes."' USADA
arbitrations are conducted according to the Supplementary Procedures,
which are modifications of the American Arbitration Association's Rules for
Arbitration is
Commercial Arbitration. 173 The CAS Code of Sports-Related
74
based on international commercial arbitration procedures. 1
A fundamental assumption that shapes commercial arbitration is that the
disputes are between equal parties-parties with roughly equal resources and
equal access to the evidence. This assumption grows, in part, from the
nature of the dispute being settled. Contracts are presumed to be agreements
based on mutual assent, entered into freely. Commercial arbitration grew up
as a method for merchants to settle their disputes, and these merchants were
viewed as equals.175 Further evidence of this fundamental assumption can
be seen in the procedures of commercial arbitration. The tradition of
limiting discovery and requiring each party to pay the expenses7 6of the
arbitration assumes equal access to information and equal resources. 1
Even if the current arbitration system is not based on an assumption that
the parties are equal in important ways, the system is unable to address the
imbalance of power between governing bodies and athletes (given force in
the substantive rules), the imbalance of resources, and the unequal access to
the important evidence in doping cases. The commercial arbitration system
is unable to address these imbalances because it accepts the principle of noninterference in the decisions of associations and thereby will not question the
rules that it is enforcing.1 77 In doping arbitrations, the rules that specifically
perpetuate the imbalance of power which arbitrators will not question are:
the presumption that sample collection and laboratory testing have been
performed properly, and the accompanying burdens of proof for

172. See Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performanceof the Doping Court: How the Court of
Arbitrationfor Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1206 (2005).
173. See AAA Supplementary Procedures 2004, supra note 46, at Rule 1.
174. CAS's parentage and its procedural rules can be traced to commercial dispute traditions;
the International Olympic Committee working group that created CAS in 1983 modeled CAS after
the leading commercial private dispute settlement systems of the time. See Court of Arbitration for
Sport, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II, 1998-2000 775 (Matthew Reeb ed., 2002); see Straubel, supra
note 172.
175. See Earl S. Wolaver, The HistoricalBackground of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REv. 132, 133 (1934).
176. American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures R-50 (2009), availableat http://www.adr.org (follow the link to Arbitration, Commercial
Rules) [hereinafter AAA Commercial Procedures] (stating that all expenses of the arbitration shall
be borne equally by both sides, except the expense of party witnesses, which will be borne by that
party).
177. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
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exoneration.7

8

The system is then unable to address these imbalances

because of the rules and traditions of limiting discovery. Limiting discovery
is problematic when the most important evidence in a doping case is
produced by the partners of the prosecution: the laboratories. The current
system is also unable to address the power imbalances because of the
tradition of eschewing rules of evidence.7 9 Rules of evidence protect the
reliability and quality of the evidence relied upon. Rules of evidence in
doping cases would help protect against the use of unreliable science. Rules
of evidence also would protect athletes from improper prejudicial evidence.
The commercial arbitration system did not work well in LaTasha's case.
The system made it hard to obtain the necessary evidence, it failed to reach a
conclusion promptly, and it failed to prevent an abusive and unsupportable
appeal. The current system must abandon the commercial model and adopt
a system that addresses these problems.
VIII. WHAT THE SYSTEM SHOULD LOOK LIKE?

If the current system is not working, how should it be changed to deal
with the true nature of doping discipline? At the doctrinal level, the system
must recognize the imbalance between governing bodies and athletes and
take two large scale steps to address that imbalance. The first step is to
abandon the doctrine of the law of association as the conceptual framework
in which doping charges take place, replacing the law of association
doctrines with disciplinary law doctrines. The second step is to adopt many
of the procedures required in criminal proceedings.
In order to completely change the current system as suggested, both
rules prescribed by WADA and procedures employed by CAS (and the
AAA-CAS of North America) must be changed. Change by both WADA
and CAS would have worldwide effect, as both agencies are international.
Change, however, may be politically and practically difficult, if not a nonstarter. Nevertheless, it may be possible to effect changes, particularly some
of the more specific suggestions below, within the United States, hoping that
others will follow the lead. Such changes would be permissible within the
world system under Article 8.1 of the WADC, which recognizes that
individual countries must be allowed to achieve the goals of the WADC

178. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
179. AAA Commercial Procedures, supra note 176, at Rule 31 (stating that conformity to
"legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary").
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within the workings of their own legal traditions. 80 Further, allowing the

United States to implement some of its own particular measures, while
remaining true to the objectives of the WADC, would be to recognize
international comity and employ the well-recognized concept behind
Directives in the European Union. ' 8' The United States could achieve many
of the changes through modifications to the rules of arbitration. Below are

specific suggestions.
A. Arbitrators
Within the United States, a roster of fully dedicated arbitrators should be
created with real input from athletes. A method should be developed to
allow and obligate the arbitrators to devote themselves full-time to the cases,
perhaps a retainer system or salary. The roster could be relatively small, to
ensure expertise and economy. A random system of appointment should
the arbitrators should follow the Model
replace party selection. Finally,
82
Code of Judicial Conduct. 1
B. Appeals

De novo appeals must be replaced with appeals on the record, and
appropriate standards of review must be developed.

The doctrines of res

judicata, issue estoppel, and double jeopardy must be adopted. Strict time
limits for completion of the appeal must be created and enforced.

83

C. Discovery
Rules permitting pre-hearing discovery must be developed that allow
athletes to fully investigate their defenses. The prosecution, USADA or
WADA, should not be allowed to make the rules of discovery nor shield
potentially important information. 184 An obligation to disclose exculpatory
180. WADC 2009, supra note 29, art. 8.1, at 48.
181. See The Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 49, Mar. 25, 1957, availableat
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm#founding.
182. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct seeks to ensure that judges in federal cases are
neutral; the Canons regulate areas such as: Impartiality, Decorum, Integrity, Independence,
Avoidance of Impropriety, Competence, and Diligence. Judges are required to act without bias or
prejudice, and are forbidden from communicating ex parte with either party. Furthermore, they are
required to recuse themselves if they every acted as a lawyer in the matter before them, or have any
economic interest in the issue before them. See generally MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2007).
183. In LaTasha's case, almost two months passed from the time of the first "award" to the
filing of the appeal by WADA. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
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evidence should exist at all stages of the process. 185 WADA lab personnel
should be permitted to testify on the behalf of athletes.
D. Evidence
A comprehensive code of evidence should be adopted, perhaps based on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Considering that criminal charges are
possible, athletes should not be compelled to testify and their failure to
testify should not be held against them. 86 Presumptions of compliance with
International Standards should be done away with, and International
Standards should be subject to challenge. The87inclusion of a substance on
the prohibited list should be open to challenge.
E. Process Management and Precedent
Time limits, for both the testing and investigation stage and the hearing
stage should be created and enforced, except with the consent of the athlete.
The doctrine of precedent should be fully adopted, and precedent made fully
available to the public.1 88 A system to reconcile inconsistent precedent
should also be developed.

185. Currently there is no obligation to disclose exculpatory information. See supra note 115
and accompanying text.
186. This is a constitutional right, ensured by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
that a person accused of a crime is not required to testify in his own behalf. See U.S. Const. amend.
V. Related to that issue, within standard criminal trial procedures, is the right of the accused to be
free from the use of improper interrogations against him at trial. See Chiavario, supra note 148, at 4.
187. Challenges to the inclusion of a substance on the prohibited list could be limited to proof
of the substance's ability to enhance performance. Such challenges are justifiable considering the
number of times athletes have been punished for taking substances that were later taken off the
prohibited list because later found to not be performance enhancing. See Too Little, Too Late for
Lund, http://www.vancouvergamesforum.com/tag/steroids (last visited Oct. 17, 2009). The most
famous of these cases is that of Zack Lund. Id. Lund had been taking the hair growth drug
finasteride for several years before it was added to the prohibited list. Id. Because he was unaware
that finasteride had been added to the prohibited list, he continued to take it and tested positive
shortly before the 2006 Olympic Games in Turin. Id. A gold medal favorite in luge (one-man sled
racing), Lund was suspended for a year and missed the Turin Games. Id. Two years later, WADA
removed finasteride from the Prohibited List because it did not enhance performance or mask other
prohibited substances. Id.
188. The Valparaiso University Sports Law Clinic has created and maintains an online database
of available Olympic Movement arbitration decisions, which can be found at
www.sportslawclinic.org. CAS does not currently publish all doping decisions; CAS and all doping
arbitration bodies should be required to publish all decisions.
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IX. BIG PICTURE REMEDY

The story of USADA v. Jenkins reveals a system created by a monopoly
that wields power without sufficient restriction or balance. The system's
current flaws can be addressed by adopting the above specific suggestions.
However, as much as athletes would like to be optimistic, those suggestions
are not likely to be adopted or sustained until the monopoly's powers are
countervailed in one of three ways:
(1)The legal fiction that sustains the monopoly, namely the theory of
voluntary association, is replaced with a legal doctrine that recognizes the
monopolistic power of sports governing bodies; or
(2)An athletes' union with genuine bargaining power is organized,
perhaps starting with United States based union organized under U.S. Labor
Law; or
(3)A court finds that USADA (and potentially other National AntiDoping Organizations) is a state actor and that participation in sports is a
property right that can only be taken away through constitutionally
restrained methods.
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